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1   Introduction  
This paper addresses improved principles for verification and validation to establish 
confidence in robustness of adaptive software systems, to include uncertainty with 
respect to cyber environment and dynamics of internal system configuration. It  
applies to component based systems with probabilistic decision making at multiple 
levels and bridges the gap between checking the correctness of a single component 
and validating systems composed of many components. 
Robust adaptive software design requires substantial architectural support. Sound 
architectural models with adaptive probabilistic software components in cyber  
systems and associated quality assurance methods collectively gain the ability to re-
place bits of systems while maintaining system dependability [1]. We focus on system 
design with recorded rationale to make the testing of adaptive probabilistic software 
components in cyber systems possible.  
This requires a shift from scenario-based testing to architecture-based quality  
assurance [2, 3, 4], along with a shift from code-based adaptation to architecture-
based adaptation [5, 6, 7]. A good cyber system architecture would have associated 
dependability properties that express stable system requirements, requirements on the 
subsystems, and a sound software evolution model capturing the design rationale [8]. 
For systems that are supposed to be automatically adaptive, the adaptation is accom-
plished by structures explicitly visible in the software architecture. The architecture 
itself would provide some degree of dependability guarantees, regardless of specific 
configuration. Testing and analysis would be applied to a suitably specified architec-
tural model in addition to the system implementation, as described in section 4.  
Realizing this vision will require a more precise and detailed description of the archi-
tecture than is commonly developed in current practice 
Robust composite systems can be composed of components in a disciplined man-
ner, according to a carefully designed software architecture. A software architecture 
consists of: 
1.  A set of components 
2.  An interconnection pattern for the components, and 
3.  A set of constraints on the components and connections. 
The constraints typically express various kinds of requirements associated with  
the entire systems as well as with the components and connections of the architecture 
[9, 22]. 
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An architecture model is an explicit and precise definition of an architecture that 
specifies the details of its structure and the constraints. Architecture models play a 
crucial role in the design and testing of flexible systems, especially for those that are 
supposed to be self-adapting at runtime. In this context, the constraints associated 
with the entire system express invariant requirements that are supposed to be met in 
all the configurations that can be reached via adaptation transitions. The constraints 
on the components and the connections express the common principles of operation 
shared by all of those configurations.  
In a well-designed adaptive system the invariant requirements can be established 
based solely on the constraints associated with the components and the connections. 
This enables the system to operate properly regardless of which concrete components 
are chosen to fill each component slot in the architecture model, as long as each con-
crete component satisfies the constraints associated with its component slot. In this 
vision, each component slot has a set of compatible components, all of which satisfy 
the role requirements associated with a given slot in the architecture, but the individ-
ual components may differ in the specifics of their behavior within the envelope  
defined by the role requirements. This set may be further organized according to fea-
ture parameters that characterize the degree of component behavior variability that 
can be accommodated by the architecture model. 
The individual components associated with a given slot in the architecture have to 
be certified with respect to the role requirements associated with the slot. All variants 
of these components must satisfy the minimum common role requirements. In cases 
where alternative slot-compatible components have different specialized capabilities, 
the role requirements may include corresponding specialized requirement clauses  
that are conditioned on the particular feature parameter values that call out the sub-
requirements for those specialized capabilities. 
2   How Testing for Adaptive Systems Differs from Traditional 
Testing 
Traditional software testing techniques like scenario-based integration testing are 
commonly used for assessing dependability of today's software systems. These tech-
niques are strongly dependent on a particular system configuration and its platform. A 
major drawback is that when the system configuration or its platform changes, it is 
necessary to reconstruct the test cases and rerun them.  Plugging in a new software 
component will lead to a completely different system and will likely invalidate previ-
ous test results, while changes to the cyber environment may reduce the effective 
coverage of the test scenarios previously used. Therefore, these techniques are not 
effective for testing adaptive probabilistic software components in cyber systems 
where dynamic system configuration and frequent changes are the norm. 
Cyber-physical systems are an important special case of adaptive systems [10]. 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are integrations of computation and physical proc-
esses. Embedded computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes, 
with feedback loops where physical processes affect computations and vice versa. 
The technology builds on the older (but still very young) discipline of embedded sys-
tems, computers and software embedded in devices whose principle mission is not 
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computation, such as cars, toys, medical devices, and scientific instruments. CPS  
integrate the dynamics of the physical processes with those of the software and net-
working, providing abstractions and modeling, design, and analysis techniques for the 
integrated whole.  [28]. 
A cyber-physical system consists of software, computers, and physical compo-
nents. The software in such systems is typically used to control the physical parts in a 
way to achieve given goals such as safety concerns, maximizing system utility, and 
minimizing costs. This control is typically based on sensor readings, and signals  
that control actuators, both of which have finite accuracy and delay. In large scale  
contexts, there are generally a variety of goals to be achieved, a variety of physical 
components to control and coordinate, multiple available sensors and actuators, envi-
ronmental conditions cannot be perfectly predicted, and all physical components  
are subject to failure. In many contexts of interest, the cyber-physical systems are 
expected to operate in inhospitable and possibly hostile environments [8, 11]. 
A similar problem also occurs when the application has to be used in a cyber envi-
ronment different from the one for which it was originally designed and tested, which 
is expected to be common for reusable adaptive probabilistic systems and compo-
nents. This raises an important concern since flexible systems are subjected to  
frequent changes. In the context of automatically adaptive systems, the situation is 
even more severe, since adaptation is supposed to happen at runtime, rapidly, and 
with little or no human intervention. This does not provide enough time for traditional 
test and evaluation procedures, which are typically time consuming, labor intensive, 
and dependent on human expertise. We therefore seek techniques that can be applied 
in advance without detailed knowledge of the specifics of the new configuration and 
the new operating environment. We need to find principles and methods for quality 
assurance that can apply to a family of possible new configurations and a family of 
possible cyber environments simultaneously [12].  
Traditional quality assurance approaches rely heavily on testing methods that  
assume system environment and system configuration are fixed and known prior to 
testing. These assumptions are invalid for adaptive complex probabilistic systems. 
Noisy data, deception, and surprise attack tactics are likely for many critical and mili-
tary systems, making system environment uncertain.  
System adaptation and machine learning are inconsistent with keeping system con-
figuration fixed. We propose to model these phenomena as the choice between differ-
ent configurations that share the same principles of operation and architecture, but 
differ in specific components that can be compatibly plugged into corresponding slots 
in the architecture. Probabilistic systems can be also be modeled in this framework, as 
nondeterministically choosing between components at runtime, where each of the 
alternative components realizes a different decision strategy. An adaptive system must 
be designed so that it can continue to operate properly despite replacement of compo-
nents with other plug-compatible components that may differ in the details of their 
behavior and capabilities. For example, this strategy is applicable when a variety of 
robotic platforms are built from a designated set of plug-compatible electronic  
components, each of which has its own specialized purpose and has been designed to 
accomplish a specific aspect of a complex mission [29]. 
 
 Testing Adaptive Probabilistic Software Components in Cyber Systems 231 
 
Fully realizing the dependable architecture vision thus requires new paradigms for 
both system synthesis and quality assurance. We propose such a paradigm here, based 
on the concepts of mathematical dependability contracts, interchangeable software 
parts, and computer-aided enforcement of dependability contracts, both during V & V 
and at runtime. For adaptive systems, a dependable architecture includes an explicit 
adaptation model, with its own requirements, structure, principles of operation, and 
desired dependability properties. For probabilistic systems, requirements will be  
expressed in terms of constraints that admit multiple, non-deterministic outcomes. 
Deterministic systems become a special case, in which the constraints are tight 
enough to admit only a single behavior in each situation. We assume that multi-
component systems will be designed using adaptive architectures that define the roles 
of the individual components along with the protocols for the interactions among the 
components and parameterized goals that are to be achieved by the interactions, using 
a refinement of the framework described in [13]. 
We focus primarily on the V & V aspect, but include aspects of synthesis in cases 
where constrained design techniques that guarantee certain aspects of correctness by 
construction via special-purpose design rules, analysis and checking at design time 
are more effective than methods that seek to certify arbitrary unconstrained designs. 
Current approaches to system development and testing are more analogous to indi-
vidual craftsmanship than they are to modern concepts of mass production and inter-
changeable parts. Craftsmen used to build things by individually tuning mating parts 
until they properly fit together. In such a context, designs could be relatively informal 
and relatively rough. Current software testing practices work this way, particularly for 
integration testing. Such approaches are not feasible for adaptive systems because the 
number of possible configurations is much too large (exponential in the number of 
independently adaptable components) to feasibly test them all in advance. 
In modern mass production environments, parts are built to standards with pre-
cisely specified tolerances, and it is up to the designer to determine and verify the 
tolerances necessary to make the design work for any combination of parts that meet 
the specified tolerances. For example, modern audio systems are designed this way. 
There exist specific standards for audio specifying how things need to fit together in 
order for components from different vendors to work together effectively, and com-
ponents are tested based on these standards, without knowledge of the specifics of the 
other components they will be connected to. Determining the tolerances necessary to 
make this work is difficult in general, and current practice depends on highly skilled 
individuals to get the standards right. However, standards for audio system compo-
nents can be relatively simple and manageable via relatively informal processes only 
because the requirements for stereo systems are very simple and insensitive to the 
meaning of the signals they are processing. An audio system is not concerned about 
whether it is playing a song or the news. This simplification does not apply to most 
software systems. 
3   The Scientific Problem 
We are seeking analogous synthesis and quality assurance techniques for systems 
involving software. For software systems, whose behavior is usually sensitive to the 
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meaning of the data, new types of standards will be needed to accomplish a similar 
function, along with scientific methods for designing and checking the standards to 
ensure the system will meet its dependability properties, as well as checking confor-
mance of individual components to the standards. This additional degree of rigor is 
needed for software standards intended to meet specific requirements despite varied 
choices of components (system adaptation) or nondeterministic variations in the  
behavior of a single component (probabilistic systems) because such standards are 
considerably more complex than the standards supporting mass production for elec-
tronic or mechanical systems. We are studying principles, models, and methods to 
enable general static analysis techniques to be combined with testing methods that can 
support statistically significant conclusions about conformance of components to ar-
chitecture standards. Targeted static analyses range from techniques involving general 
mathematical proofs requiring human assistance to special purpose algorithmic meth-
ods that can be completely automated for complex applications.  
One context in which the proposed approach can be employed is in the design of 
interchangeable components for robotic platforms. Here the focus is on cooperative 
robotic platforms where payloads, sensors and tasks are divided into various special-
ized modular platforms. The modular specialized platforms can then be assembled as 
a team, custom tailored for the various mission requirements.  Decomposing the com-
plex task sequences required of autonomous robots into a hierarchy of increasingly 
sophisticated control systems provides a powerful method for escalating a robot’s 
degree of autonomy [29]. Analogous synthesis and quality assurance techniques in 
designing the software for this, or different levels of autonomy at different levels of 
control, is needed to form a hierarchical command control structure that can deploy 
and orchestrate a network of autonomous robots.   
4   How to Test Adaptive Systems 
The proposed approach to quality assurance for adaptive systems encompasses: 
(1) analysis of software architecture with respect to requirements on many possible 
configurations, 
(2) testing software components against required architecture properties driven by 
both validated statistical models of expected cyber environments and trans-
formed models, and  
(3) a combination of testing and analytical methods for verifying non-interference 
between components.  
 
The transformed models compensate for uncertainty about possible cyber environ-
ments by combining alternative possible models and amplifying the frequency of rare 
events.  
A possible quality assurance approach for adaptive systems is illustrated below 
[14, 15, 31]. 
 




The fundamental operation of such an approach can be outlined as follows: 
 
   1.a. System-wide capabilities are characterized by a set of dependability proper-
ties that must hold in all acceptable system configurations. These properties 
comprise the dependability contract for the system as a whole. They become 
part of the architecture for the system, and serve as the basis for system qual-
ity assurance. Dependability contracts are primarily technical rather than  
legal documents, and they are intended to be checkable via software.  
   1.b. The designers of the architecture determine the common structure of the sys-
tem and develop the component-level dependability contracts for the subsys-
tems and connectors. The common structure consists of connection patterns 
and subsystem slots to which all configurations must conform. 
2. The quality assurance team tests each component (subsystem and connector) 
against its dependability contract. This is envisioned to be an automated 
process to enable sufficient large sets of test cases for statistically significant 
conclusions about desirable dependability levels. The cost for this step is 
proportional to the number of components, and the process must be done 
once for each version of each atomic component. Technologies for doing this 
are known, and some of them are starting to be used in practice [30].  
3. The quality assurance team checks the structure of the architecture and the 
dependability contracts for subsystems and connectors to make sure they are 
strong enough to guarantee the system-wide dependability properties in all 
possible configurations. This is a new process that uses symbolic analysis 
techniques. Assuring the feasibility of this step is one of our objectives. 
4. The quality assurance team checks components for non-interference. This 
process is computer-aided. Many of the technologies for this are known and 
some of them are commonly used, such as data representation hiding en-
forced by programming language scope rules and type checking. Additional 
research is needed to get a complete set. This part of the process ensures that 
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components that work correctly in isolation will continue to do so when they 
are connected. Some examples of mechanisms that can cause this type of  
interference include mutual exclusion constraints, deadlocks, resource con-
straints (memory and bandwidth limits, etc), timing constraints, out of 
bounds memory references, etc. 
5. The assumptions about the operating environment that the architecture de-
pends on are checked by runtime monitoring. This can be done using BIT 
(Built-In-Test) technology that is currently in use in some DoD systems. 
This is recommended for all reusable components. 
6. Runtime checks that the machine code actually running in the system corre-
sponds to the source code that was subjected to quality assurance processes, 
and processes for restoring it to the proper state before execution if these 
checks fail. These processes are necessary because of the following plausible 
failure modes: 
 
a. Memory-corrupting bugs—these include out of bounds write opera-
tions on arrays and through invalid pointers. Such bugs can cause 
seemingly innocuous statements to overwrite parts of the program it-
self at runtime, with unpredictable and potentially catastrophic results. 
b. Deliberate cyber-attacks—compromise of system security via network 
or unauthorized insider access to systems can deliberately modify ma-
chine code at run-time. 
c. Memory state corruption due to hard radiation, which is plausible in 
some WMD scenarios, spacecraft, nuclear power systems, scientific 
and medical applications, etc.  
 
Some approaches to this problem can be found in [15]. 
 
Probabilistic methods for testing flexible modular systems to high levels of statistical 
confidence should be viable for testing complex probabilistic systems.  This strategy 
focuses on using high-fidelity profile-based environment models to automatically 
generate test cases by sampling from probability density functions or other kinds of 
probabilistic models that characterize environment parameters.  When combined with 
automated execution and output checking techniques, such models are capable of 
driving automated software testing, enabling affordable sample sizes large enough to 
support statistically significant conclusions about system behavior.  
5   Challenges in Validating Statistical Models for a Wide Range of 
Operating Environments 
Known methods for creating validated statistical models for operating environments 
include least-squares matching of known parametric distributions, use of the Bayesian 
Information Criterion or Akaike Information Criterion to choose the best of several 
models, and non-parametric methods such as kernel density estimation. All of these 
methods depend on the availability of historical data characterizing a given cyber en-
vironment, and assume that the intended cyber environment is known in advance.  
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These assumptions are problematic for adaptive systems, because the actual system 
configuration is not necessarily known in advance. In the context of unprecedented 
systems, the availability of historical data is also problematic. 
Prior work has explored some approaches to modeling of unknown operating  
environments in the context of software filters for maritime tracks [15], and we are 
studying, refining and extending these approaches. The legacy operating environment 
for the previously studied software consisted of large, slow moving ships. The new 
environment included threats from small fast boats, which are likely to be operated by 
dynamic non-state organizations such as terrorist groups or smugglers. The specific 
types of boats involved in such cases are largely unpredictable, as are the likely naviga-
tional tactics. The solution approach in this situation was to characterize the operating 
characteristics of a variety of commercially available small boats, in terms of parame-
ters such as maximum speed, maximum acceleration, maximum deceleration (sepa-
rately specified because speeding up and slowing down have different mechanisms that 
produce asymmetric results), and maximum turning rate. These parameters defined the 
limits of a neighborhood of environmental conditions of reasonable concern. Kernel 
density estimation techniques were then used to form a composite of the different pos-
sibilities for operating conditions. Although the resulting distribution covered a wider 
range of conditions than each individual possible type of boat was capable of exhibit-
ing, it provided a reasonable characterization of all conditions likely to be of concern, 
with tails that provided coverage of unexpected but possible conditions. Our initial 
study was conducted in a relatively simple two-dimensional environment. However, 
we see no fundamental reason why similar techniques could not be applied in more 
complex data domains and higher dimensional spaces. 
Adaptive systems must deal with equivocality in addition to uncertainty. Here “un-
certainty” refers to individually unpredictable events that follow a known probability 
distribution, and “equivocality” refers to situations where the probability distribution 
itself is uncertain, or possibly time varying according to unknown patterns. Uncer-
tainty corresponds to the case where the expected operating environment can be  
characterized in terms of stable types of activities that have a known past history, 
while equivocality corresponds to more dynamic situations in which unexpected and 
possibly unprecedented new kinds of events can arise. We have modeled equivocality 
in the context of possible operating environments under the assumption that “small” 
perturbations to operating environments are more likely than “large” ones. This leads 
to systematic exploration of sequences of possible environments produced by perturb-
ing transformations systematically arranged in order of increasing severity. One way 
to realize this in a way that captures likelihood of occurrence is to repeatedly compose 
the perturbation transformation to form more severe perturbations. This overall  
approach is compatible with a strategy that searches the most likely neighborhoods of 
the expected operating environment first and most thoroughly. 
6   Conclusion 
The usefulness of sound and systematic approaches for achieving dependable, flexi-
ble, and cost-effective software has been a focus of scientific interest for many years  
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[16-35]. As we move to automatically adaptive software, these types of approaches 
are appearing to become a necessity rather than a luxury, because manual artisanship 
simply cannot reach the levels of reliability and speed of adaptation that is called for. 
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